Abstract-In this paper we propose a novel authentication mechanism for session mobility in Next Generation Networks named as Hierarchical Authentication Key Management (HAKM). The design objectives of HAKM are twofold: i) to minimize the authentication latency in NGNs; ii) to provide protection against an assortment of attacks such as denial-of-service attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, guessing attacks, and capturing node attacks. In order to achieve these objectives, we combine Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) with Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) to perform local authentication for session mobility. The concept of group keys and pairwise keys with one way hash function is employed to make HAKM vigorous against the aforesaid attacks. The performance analysis and numerical results demonstrate that HAKM outperforms the existing approaches in terms of latency and protection against the abovementioned attacks.
association between two entities, which is considered not to be feasible during frequent handover in NGNs. It is because the mobile node (MN) cannot be authenticated directly by local AAA (LAAA) as it does not have enough information. The information is acquired from home AAA (HAA) which results severe security holes and latency related issues [11] .
In this paper we focus these issues and propose a novel approach called Hierarchical Authentication Key Management (HAKM). Session initiation protocol (SIP) is combined with HMIPv6 in this approach to handle the authentication in hierarchical manner. The main contributions of our proposed scheme are to reduce the authentication latency and provide defence against denial-of-service attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, guessing attacks, and capturing node attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II depicts the related work and its shortcomings, whereas in Section III mobility protocols employed in HAKM are briefly described. The algorithm of HAKM is explained in Section IV, followed by the strength of proposed scheme in Section V. The performance analysis and numerical results are presented in Section VI and VII respectively. Section VIII concludes the paper and outlines the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T) has designed security architecture in its recommendations X.805 for offering end-to-end communication. The architecture presents eight different directions in order to achieve end-to-end security in NGNs. These dimensions include access control, authentication, non-repudiation, communication security, data integrity, data confidentiality, and privacy. Several approaches have been proposed to provide security in NGNs. We summarize the limitations in these existing approaches [12] .
A. Internet Key Exchange version 2 (IKEv2)
IKEv2 is a security protocol which has been used in HMIPv6 to offer secure association between mobile node (MN) and mobility anchor point (MAP). The limitation with this protocol is that it has certain communication and computational overhead regarding involvement of cryptographic operations and requirement of number of round trips. Especially, in remote access the use of Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) for authentication increases the latency. When there is failure of recovery condition, to re-establish security associations (SAs) is time consuming. Particularly, in the case of IPsec peer because a huge number of SAs need to be reestablishing with different end points. The user interaction for re-authentication through the reestablishment of an IKE SA also affected the usability [9] .
B. IPSec
It was developed to offer security in Internet protocols. The limitation with IPSec is that it has complex key computation and management of algorithm. This complexity makes IPSec inefficient in mobile communication because of inadequate resources for calculation and limited lifetimes of battery in mobile devices. Another major problem in IPSec is due to having no support of end-to-end security in its existing commercial products. It is because of the termination of IPSec tunnel at the IPSec server, not at the final communication correspondent [10] .
C. TLS /SRTP
Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol is used to protect SIP signalling [13] , which is extensively adopted commercially [10] . The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) is used to encrypt and authenticate realtime transport protocol (RTP) packets. TLS/SRTP solution has been used to enhance the security in SIP. The limitation with this approach is that when mobile node (MN) moves across different networks, its IP address changes which disconnect the TLS/SRTP sessions. To reestablish the session, delay is occurred due to the exchange of several messages [10] [14] [15] . This greatly affects the performance regarding SIP mobility. Additionally, the responsibility of SRTP was to protect RTP packets only. No solution is there to protect non-RTP packets. Thus, the existing TLS/SRTP solution does not fulfil the security requirements for SIP in NGNs.
D. AAA Model and Diameter Protocol
To provide solution for the AAA problem regarding the request which a network receives from mobile node (MN) during its movement in foreign network, IETF has proposed AAA model [16] [17] [18] and diameter protocol [19] . Using AAA model four types of security associations (SAs) are used for sharing secret information among two network entities. The MN must provide authentication information to the domain where it using resources while roaming. One of the key challenges related to mobility of MN in conventional authentication mechanism is that MN cannot share secret information with Local AAA (LAAA) because of having no direct security association. The LAAA sends the information to Home AAA (HAAA) server of MN and wait for reply because LAAA does not have enough information to verify the authentication information of MN. This passing of information between foreign and home network makes the authentication inefficient. Additionally, the frequent handover of MN between different domains is resulting the needs of authentication for MN each time. This causes severe problem when distance increases between home network and foreign network [11] .
E. Leakage Resilient-Authenticated Key Establishment
LR-AKE scheme is proposed in [20] , which is based on the idea of public key infrastructure (PKI). PKI is providing prevention mechanism against all attacks but its heavy cryptographic calculation is not suitable for mobile devices. This limitation makes LR-AKE scheme inefficient in mobile communication [11] .
F. Local Authentication Concept for Mobile Networks
A local authentication mechanism for mobile networks has been proposed in [21] to minimize the authentication delay. In this scheme when MN moves to foreign network for the first time, the authentication request must be sent to the HAAA server. If there is a large distance between foreign network and home network server then the delay due to authentication will be long. Moreover, a strong assumption has been made about a secrete key which is pre-shared between MN and LAAA. But in AAA model there is no such concept of security association.
G. Authenticated Fast Handover in HMIPv6
A scheme proposed in [22] is based on AAA model, in which there is no security association between MN and mobility anchor point (MAP). Therefore, MAP cannot authenticate MN, and asks AAAH through AAAF (AAA server at foreign network) to generate and send the session key. If the distance is too long and frequent handover is taking place then it will result huge delay. Moreover, on the basis of analysis made in [23] this approach is declared vulnerable to several attacks such as denial of service, malicious mobile node flooding and replay attacks.
H. Fast Authentication during Handover in NGN
The fast authentication mechanism has been proposed in [24] and it has been tried to reduce handover latency, but the limitation of AAA still exists. When the MN moves from one access point to another, the information is sent to AAA server in core network which causes extra delay. Moreover no analysis and numerical results are presented to verify the efficiency of the proposed method.
III. HIERARCHICAL AUTHENTICATION KEY MANAGEMENT
A novel approach Hierarchical Authentication Key Management (HAKM) is proposed to secure session mobility in NGNs. The proposed scheme uses the concept of Combined SIP HMIPv6 [7] as shown in Fig.1 , integrating two protocols such as Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6) and Session Initiation Protocol. The combination is supplemented with QoS managers at both core network and each respective region to handle endto-end QoS in NGNs. HAKM provides defence against various attacks such as denial of service (DoS) attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, capturing node attacks, and guessing attacks. Moreover, HAKM manages the authentication mechanism locally in order to reduce delay.
The mobility protocols and QoS manager employed in HAKM are briefly described as follows. 
A. Hierarchical Mobile IPv6 (HMIPv6)
Various mobility protocols such as MIP, MIPv6, Fast MIPv6, HMIPv6, and so on are used in wireless communication to access any network through several radio access methods. The parental mobility protocol is MIP, and all the other mobility protocols are extensions of MIP [25] . The mobility management protocol used for the next generation of the IP is MIPv6. The limitations in MIPv6 are exchange of messages during frequent handover of MN. If HA is located far away from MN, then these messages are resulting extra delay, signalling overhead, and security issues [26] .
In order to resolve these issues, HMIPv6 is used to handle the signals and traffic locally [27] . It has hierarchical structure which reduces the amount of signalling exchange between distinct entities like HA, MAP, MN, and resultant node (RN). HMIPv6 has Mobility Anchor Point (MAP) at each region, which acts as local HA. MAP has been introduced in the updated RFC 5380, which have made HMIPv6 more efficient. Two types of addresses are used in HMIPv6, the first one is regional care of address (RCoA), and the second one is on-link care of Address (LCoA). Each region is represented by RCoA, whereas LCoA is the address of the access router through which MN is connected with MAP [28] [29] .
When MN initiates handover within the region, only its LCoA is changed at MAP. The change of LCoA means that MN moving from one access router to another. Both HA and RN are unaware of the local handover. This transparency helps in reducing delay, minimizing signalling overhead, and making the communication secure.
If MN is moving from one region to another, it's RCoA is changed and updated at HA. The updated RCoA is then forwarded to RN in order to continue the communication. HA and RN have the knowledge of MN's RCoA only.
B. Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
SIP is a text based signalling protocol defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [3] . It is an application layer protocol, which can establish and tear down the multimedia sessions. Various entities like user agents, proxy servers, redirect servers, and registrars are used in SIP [29] [30] . User agent means both the ends participate in the communication. Proxy servers can act as both client and server, and its main functionality is routing. It works as an intermediary entity to make the request on behalf of other clients.
The main function of redirect server is to allow proxy servers to direct the SIP session invitation to outside regions. Registrar is a server used to accept REGISTER requests for the registration of one or more IP addresses to a certain SIP URL. It is commonly located with SIP proxies, but it can be placed with redirect server for network scalability [6] [26] .
SIP support four types of mobility, these are terminal mobility, personal mobility, session mobility, and service mobility. In order to establish session, the mobility is performed in SIP at following two stages [31] .
Pre-call mobility: When MN obtains a new IP address before receiving or making call, it will register itself by sending REGISTER message to SIP server connected with MAP. The registrar in SIP server will register this address. Mid-call mobility: If MN initiates the handover during ongoing session, then mid-call mobility is performed. MN send re-INVITE message to SIP proxy server, which is sent to RN. The RN replies with the 200ok message to continue the session smoothly.
C. QoS Manager
As NGNs are the combinations of heterogeneous networks. Hence, managing this diverse nature of NGNs is a challenging task. Further, if the goal is to enhance security in NGNs, then we have to shell out for this. Therefore, quality of service (QoS) cannot be ignored. For this purpose, the proposed method includes QoS manager, which handles QoS issues like bandwidth management, reservation of resources, and network policies' implementation [6] [7] . Handovers of varied natures are also handled using this module. It makes sure that the resources are provided in advance when MN initiates handover.
In our proposed method, QoS managers are employed at two levels. The first level consists of core QoS (CQoS) manager, which handles QoS issues at the core network. CQoS manager is also responsible to provide resources upon the request made by any regional QoS manger due to shortage of resources in its region.
The second level comprises regional QoS (RQoS) manager, used to manage the QoS issues in their respective regions. RQoS managers of different regions coordinate with one another to establish seamless communication.
IV. HAKM ALGORITHM
The step by step procedure of Hierarchical Authentication key Management is explained in following different phases.
A. Initialization Phase
The Home Agent (HA) creates a key chain of size M before deploying the N Mobility Anchor Points (MAP) at various regions. The size of key chain in HA is greater than key chain in MAP that is M>N. Home Agent (HA) selects unique key for each MAP, which is considered to be the region key (RK).
Before making into operational, HA utilizes RK and random number RN in order to create region subkey RSK = H (RK⊕RN). The HA then uses RSK and random numbers from R 1 ~ R n to generate a key chain for each MAP.
SK 0 = H (RSK 1 ⊕R 1 ),
SK n-1 = H (RSK n ⊕R n ) Each MAP set unique key chain, RSK, and random numbers R 1 ~ R n from HA. Same hash function H (.) and K temp is used in the hierarchy. The K temp is a temporary session key for all HA, MAP, and MN where as:
To understand the proposed scheme effectively, various notations are described in Table I .
B. Authentication Phase
In 
2) Authentication of MN with MAP
When the MN wants to make a connection with MAP, first it needs to be authenticated to check that whether it is valid or not. Following steps need to be followed to authenticate the MN with MAP.
i Mobility Anchor Point (MAP) broadcasts "hello message" to the Access Routers (ARs) which comprises of:
RCoA iv When condition is true and to encrypt the succeeding messages, a group key K g is sent by MAP to MN using pairwise key. The format of new key message is mentioned below.
RCoA || LCoA || {K g } PK The flow of MN authentication with MAP is shown in Fig. 3 .
3) Authentication between Two MAPs
For the communication between two MAPs, first the authentication should be performed whether the requesting MAP is valid or not. Suppose MAP1 wants to communicate with MAP2, the authentication is performed using following steps. iv When MAP1confirms that MAP2 is valid, then a group key K gp using pairwise key is sent to MAP2 for future messaging. The new key message includes:
RCoA (MAP1) || RCoA (MAP2) || {K gp } PK The flow of authentication between two MAPs is shown in Fig. 4 . 
C. Secure Session Mobility
In order to establish the session between MN and RN, two types of mobility are focused. At the beginning of a communication when session is established, it refers to pre-call mobility. During MN movement, if the handover is initiated, then mid-call mobility is applied to maintain the session smoothly.
In both types of mobility security is an important factor to be considered. Our proposed scheme presents an invulnerable mechanism to maintain the security either at the start of session or at the middle of a session. 
1) Pre -call Mobility Authentication
Here pre-call mobility authentication is considered for the case when MN wants to communicate with RN, and both located at the same region. Following steps need to be performed while establishing secure pre-call mobility.
i MN sends INVITE message to SIP server connected with MAP. The message is encrypted with group key that is K g . The message includes:
RCoA || {MAC (Invite message)} K g || LCoA Whereas RCoA is the Regional Care of address of MAP to which MN and SIP server are connected. LCoA is on-Link Care of Address of MN.
ii The SIP server sends the address of RN which is also encrypted with K g . Here the RN belongs to same region, so the LCoA of RN is sent to MN. The message from SIP server to MN includes:
LCoA || {MAC (LCoA (RN) If any node moving outside of the region during ongoing session, its new RCoA and LCoA is authenticated first and then mid-call mobility is performed.
V. STRENGTH OF HAKM AGAINST ATTACKS
The security can be breached by an outsider node which has lack of knowledge about the Keys in the key chain or about pairwise keys. It can be a node, which is captured by an attacker and act as an internal node. Our proposed scheme focuses the possible attacks that can be made by an attacker. These attacks are discussed here such as denial of service (DoS) attacks, man-in-themiddle attacks, capturing node attacks, and guessing attacks.
A. Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks
The common attacks which are considered in networks are denial of service attacks in which the malicious entity makes a service unavailable to the intended users. The attackers can make the services unavailable such as occupying the network available bandwidth, CPU power consumption, occupying memory in the server, and network equipments without proper authorization.
In our proposed scheme, defence mechanism is presented against DoS. It is due to the use of MAC and one-way hash function in which the HA, MAP, MN and RN exchange messages without expecting any acknowledgment. If an attacker tries to stop the message from reaching to the nodes, the HA, MAP, and MN are unaware of this.
B. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
Man-in-the-middle attacks are considered as a category of eavesdropping in which the malicious entity establishes autonomous connection with the nodes and takes over the control to handle all the messages between MN and RN. Both MN and RN think that they are directly communicating with one another through a private connection. However, in real an attacker makes them fool and controlled all their details.
The proposed scheme uses pairwise keys and group keys between all the entities like HA, MAP, MN, and RN in a hierarchical manner. Therefore, if malicious entity has no knowledge about the pairwise keys or group keys, it still cannot make this attack. An attacker cannot eavesdrop and even cannot make changes in the message. Thus, man-in-the-middle attack does not have any influence on NGNs using this scheme.
C. Capturing Node Attacks
As NGNs are mixture of heterogeneous networks, preventing this type of attack is very difficult. The attacker can try to obtain some material of the K temp and pairwise key from any node using the capturing node attacks. In our proposed scheme the K temp is only used to create pairwise key in each hierarchy and then discarded. Different pairwise keys are used in each hierarchy. Therefore based on characteristics of pairwise keys, if the adversary captured any node and try to obtain its internal material and harm other nodes, it cannot be happened.
D. Guessing Attacks
Guessing attacks are considered an important attack in any security system. Suppose that a malicious entity can get data or information related to keys in NGNs. The key can also be guessed using public information. In our proposed scheme, the key at each hierarchy is changed at regular intervals. Furthermore, different group keys and pairwise keys are used at each hierarchy to encrypt messages, so guessing attack cannot infect this system.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF HAKM

A. Analytical Authenticated Mobility Models
The hexagonal structure shown in Fig. 6 is used for our authenticated mobility models. The structure shows an example of MAP region which is composed of cells surrounded by circles of cells. Every region consists of C circles of the same size. The inner most cell at the centre is represented by "0" surrounded by circle having cell denoted by "1". Similarly the no "2" represents cells in circle 2 and it is also assumed that each cell is managed by one access router. The total number of cells up to circle C in a MAP region is represented in following equation.
Two types of mobility models such as fluid-flow and random-walk models [32] [33] are used for the analysis of HAKM. Fluid-flow model is suitable for the users moving with erratic speed, high mobility, and changing of directions. Whereas, random-walk model is appropriate for mobility of pedestrian users having small geographical area such as residential area or campus. 
1) Fluid-flow Model
The MN roaming within a MAP region is spread in the range of (0, 2  ) using fluid-flow model. Let S be the average speed of MN (m/s), r the cell radius, d the density of the user in a cell, P a , P b the perimeters of cell and MAP region with N circles, and C a , C b represent region crossing rates. These are represented in (2) and (3).
( 12 6)
2) Random-walk Model
In random-walk model the upcoming position of MN is calculated by its preceding position in addition with the value of random variable drawn from an arbitrary distribution. It is assumed that the current position of MN in a cell of circle "c", the probability of moving ahead to another cell of circle "c+1" or backward to a cell of circle "c-1" are represented in (3) and (4). 
The probability of MN staying in current cell and moving to another cell is assumed k and 1-k respectively. Equations (6) and (7) represent the transition probability from the state c to c+1 or c-1.
Assuming ,
cC
 is a steady-state probability of state c inside a MAP region of C circles. The , cC  is represented in (8) using the transition probabilities. 
B. Latency Analysis
The performance of the HAKM is compared with the authentication mechanism in MIPv6, Fast MIPv6, and SMIPv6. In Fig. 1 
3) Latency in MIPv6
The MN in MIPv6 discovers its movement through router solicitation or router advertisement when it enters new subnet. The new CoA is configured by MN using prefix information in router advertisement. For the verification of unique new CoA, Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) is used. The delay for detecting movement and new CoA gaining is represented in following formula. When new CoA is configured, then authentication is performed which at least 1.5 round trip delay needs between the MN and RN [6] . The total delay for authentication is represented as follows. 
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6) Latency in HAKM
In our proposed approach HMIPv6 is used which manages the authentication and traffic locally, and delay is reduced to handsome amount. The delays for detection of movement, CoA configuration and packet delivery are same like MIPv6, but the delays for authentication and binding updates are different which are calculated below.
As the authentication is handled locally, so the problem of round trip delay is resolved in HMIPv6. Thus, the delay for authentication is expressed as:
T A = T MM + T MR As the MN moves and its mobility is handled locally, so the BU delay is significantly reduced which is represented below.
BU MM
TT  The delay for packet delivery is expressed as:
T T T  Therefore, the total calculated delay in proposed method is shown as follows.
The comparison in Table II demonstrates that the delay calculated in HAKM is greatly reduced which makes it efficient as compared to MIPv6, FMIPv6, and SMIPv6.
VII. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
In this section we present the numerical results of HAKM and its comparison with MIPv6, FMIPv6, and SMIPv6. The OPNET simulation tool is used to obtain numerical results. NGNs environment is deployed consisting of heterogeneous networks such as core network, WiMAX, TDMA based network, WLAN and simple voice network. The common parameters set for the simulation are shown in Table III . In our proposed scheme each region comprises of MAP, RQoS manager, SIP server, and also equipped with HAKM mechanism. The mobility and authentication is handled locally which reduce the latency to great extent. Moreover attacks like denial-of-service attacks, man-inthe-middle attacks, guessing attacks, and capturing node attacks are performed to check the strength of HAKM. The results demonstrate that the proposed scheme strongly protects the communication between MN and RN against the above mentioned attacks.
Figs. 7, 8, and 9 demonstrate the relationship between authentication latency and average velocity of user for MAP region. The results in Figs. 7 and 8 are using random-walk model. The stay of MN in current region results the lower latency and less likely to move between regions. In Fig. 7 the authentication latency is obtained for handover within region. In Fig. 9 , the authentication latency is shown for fast moving device such as vehicular. Fluid-flow model is used, in which the lower velocity is resulting a lower cell/region crossing rate and less delay. The result shows that by increasing the speed the authentication latency is increased. Variation in results is because of increasing and decreasing the speed of vehicular device. Our proposed mechanism results seem outstanding in fast moving device as compared to MIPv6, FMIP6, and SMIPv6. 
T T T T T 
   is shown in Fig. 10 . The result shows the latency for our proposed approach which lies between 400 to 500ms and it is quietly reduced as compared to MIPv6, FMIPv6, and SMIPv6. It is verified that by handling the authentication, signal, and traffic locally the latency is reduced to handsome amount.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we proposed a novel Hierarchical Authentication Key Management to handle the security locally during session mobility. Combination of SIP with HMIPv6 is employed to manage the authentication in hierarchical order. The target objectives of HAKM are reducing the latency and defence against the attacks including denial-of-service attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks, guessing attacks, and capturing node attacks. The efficiency of proposed approach is compared with MIPv6, FMIPv6, and SMIPv6. Two types of mobility models such as fluid-flow model and random walk model are used for the performance analysis. Numerical results are obtained based on mathematical analysis which verified that HAKM is quite efficient.
Further study will be carried out to evaluate the performance of HAKM approach in terms of processing cost and packet loss. The target will be to make our approach more efficient.
